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Abstract
Life expectancies are rapidly increasing and uncertain in all countries in Europe. To keep pension systems affordable, policy reforms are to be implemented which will encourage individuals to work longer. In this paper we analyze the impact of working and living longer on pension incomes in ive European countries and assess the impact of these policy reforms on the inancial well-being of the elderly. The paper shows the diversity of the policy measures taken in these countries. Furthermore, we analyze the inancial incentives for working longer and postponing claiming pension beneits and we assess the attractiveness of these options.
Lastly, we study how increases in life expectancies and survival probabilities affect pension incomes.
Introduction
Life expectancies are rapidly increasing and uncertain in all European countries. To keep pension systems affordable, policy reforms are to be implemented which will encourage individuals to work longer. These policy reforms will adjust pension systems in such a way that if life expectancy increases without adjustments in the retirement age, the level of pension income will decrease. In this paper we analyze the impact of working and living longer on pension incomes in ive European countries. We assess the impact of policy reforms on the inancial well-being of the elderly. We show the diversity of the policy measures taken in these countries and outline a number of lessons that can be learned from their experiences. This paper focuses on adjustments in the pension system due to an increasing life expectancy and uncertainty about further increases in ive European countries: Estonia, Finland, Hungary, the Netherlands and Poland. These ive countries have rather different pension systems and differ markedly in their (planned) reforms due to increased life expectancy.
Hungary, to take the most extreme example, has recently returned to a purely pay as you go (PAYG) system where pension income for the elderly is fully paid for by the current active population. The country's statutory retirement age will increase in the coming years, but it is left to future policymakers to decide how increases in life expectancies, that may be faster or slower than projected, will be dealt with. There are hardly any tax incentives for individuals to accumulate lifelong retirement income to provide an additional insurance against the inancial risks of advanced age and to top off the irst pillar's pension income.
In Finland and the Netherlands on the other hand, the statutory retirement age for basic (irst pillar) pension income is linked to estimates of life expectancy and funded components in the pension system provide additional lifelong pension income. The macro longevity risk (the risk of increases in the average life expectancy) in these annuities is being shifted more and more to individuals. Table 1 provides more information on life expectancies and healthy life expectancies in the ive countries analyzed in this study and in the European Union overall. Life expectancy at the age of 65, which is the most relevant number when discussing the adequacy and sustainability of pension systems, has increased by about two years during the seven year period between 2005 and 2012 in all ive countries, for both men and women. According to these Eurostat numbers, healthy life expectancy has decreased rather than increased in some countries during this period, which seems to be at odds with the evidence presented in many other studies.
In this paper we analyze the inancial incentives to work longer and to postpone claiming pension beneit in the ive analyzed countries. We address how attractive these options are and whether or not they are actuarially fair. Moreover we analyze to what extent individual longevity risk is insured in these ive countries, using adequate inancial products, and how increases in survival probabilities affect pension incomes. in 2012 5.5 6.4 7.8 10.1 9 8.9 Source: Eurostat; * = data for healthy life expectancy at birth and at 65 for both men and women in 2005 is not comparable for Hungary, Poland and Netherlands; for healthy life expectancy at birth and at 65 for both men and women EU 27 is used and the second year is 2010.
The plan of this paper is as follows. In sections 2-6 we briely characterize the pension systems in Finland, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and the Netherlands. In section 7 we summarize and compare the evidence in the early sections on the inancial incentives to work longer and on the consequences for pension incomes of increases in life expectancy according to the current legislation and address the sustainability of the current rules of the game in the ive countries. Section 8 summarizes the evidence on the impact of increases in life expectancy on average replacement rates and the risk of poverty for speciic groups. Section 9 concludes.
The impact of living and working longer on pension incomes in Finland
The Finnish pension system
The Finnish statutory pension system consists of two main pillars. The irst pillar is an earnings-related pension scheme which is inanced through employer and employee contributions. This earnings-related pension scheme includes disability pensions. The second pillar is a residence-based national pension scheme which is inanced with tax revenues.
There is also a so-called guarantee pension income that ensures minimum security. The role of voluntary pensions is very small.
The last major pension reform came into effect in 2005. The reform introduced a longevity adjustment which cuts monthly pensions as lifetime expectancy increases. The reform also introduced measures to encourage people to work longer. In this note, we briely discuss how these reforms, together with increasing life expectancy, can be expected to inluence pension adequacy in the future.
Current pension adequacy
In terms of typical replacement rates, the Finnish pension system currently scores relatively well. The average pension of persons who retired on an old-age pension in 2012 was about 1800 euros a month (Finnish Center for Pensions, 2013) . The average pension of all persons receiving some pension (including e.g. disability pensions) was about 1400 euros. At the same time, the average wage of all full-time workers was about 3200 euros a month (Statistics Finland, 2013) . Due to progressive earnings taxation, the net replacement rates are somewhat higher than those based on these gross incomes. On the other hand, the poverty rate is somewhat elevated among the older population. In 2010, the income poverty rate in Finland was about 7 percent for the whole population, when the poverty threshold is deined as 50 percent of median household disposable income. For those aged over 65, the rate was about 13 percent. The poverty rate is especially high for women over 75 who live alone (OECD 2011).
The guarantee pension, which was introduced in 2011, should already have diminished old age poverty rates compared to these igures. The guarantee pension currently provides a minimum income of about 740 euros a month. Another mechanism that should improve the situation in the coming years is the maturing of the earnings-related pension system together with the increased labor force participation rate of women.
Longevity adjustment and beneit accrual
Roughly speaking, the longevity adjustment adjusts monthly pension beneits from the funded part of the system so that at the age of 62, the present value of pension payouts remains constant even if life expectancy changes. When computing the longevity adjustment, life time expectancy is computed based on standard life tables, rather than mortality forecasts. Every year's earnings directly affect the future pension. The accrual rate is 1.5% per year between the ages of 18 and 53 and 1.9% between the ages of 53 and 62. The age of 63 is also the eligibility age for old-age pensions. Between the ages of 63 and 68, the accrual is 4.5% per year conditional on not withdrawing pensions. This creates an incentive to work longer for individuals that have high wage relative to previously accrued pension rights. For those withdrawing pensions, the accrual rate is still only 1.5% a year.
As can be seen from igure 1, in 2030, the longevity coeficient is expected to cut pensions by about 12 percent or so. In principle, people who turn 62 in 2030 can compensate for the effect of the longevity adjustment by postponing retirement by about 2.5 years after the age of 63, beneiting from the high accrual rate of 4.5 percent. However, that would require postponing the withdrawal of pension beneits. Recent empirical evidence suggests that the high accrual rate after age 63 has not had a substantial effect on lengthening working careers (Uusitalo and Nivalainen, 2013) .
Future pension adequacy
As discussed above, there are certain reasons to believe that in terms of poverty relief, pension adequacy in Finland is going to improve in the future. The longevity adjustment is unlikely to change this because it is not applied to the (unfunded) national pensions and guarantee pensions and because it is only partially applied to disability pensions. These pension schemes are the most important ones in preventing old-age poverty. 
1978-1982, and 1998-2002
Source: Lassila and Valkonen (2014) .
As long as there is sustained labor productivity and wage growth, monthly pensions will increase over time in real terms, assuming the beneit rules are maintained. However, relative to the average wage level in the future, average monthly pension is expected to decline.
There are two main reasons for this. First, as mentioned above, it seems that workers are not postponing retirement enough to compensate for the effect of the longevity adjustment on monthly pensions. Second, during retirement, pensions are index-linked with 20 and 80 weights on wages and consumer prices, respectively. As a result, as a person gets older, the value of her pension usually declines relative to the average wage level in the future. Moreover, despite the longevity adjustment, even the earnings-related pension system
is not yet iscally sustainable in the face of population aging. This increases the risk that beneits will be cut in the future. Figure 2 shows the expected evolution of pensions for three cohorts born between 1958-1962, 1978-1982, and 1998-2002 , assuming that the current beneit will be maintained. The igure is based on results from a standard general equilibrium overlapping generations model that includes a detailed description of the Finnish pension system (see e.g. Lassila and Valkonen, 2007) . As can be seen from the lower part of the igure, relative to wages in the future, the average pension of very old people is likely to be quite low on a 50 to 100 year horizon.
The impact of living and working longer on pension incomes in Estonia
The Estonian pension system
The Estonian pension system consists of three pillars: a state pension insurance scheme (a PAYG system with deined beneit), a compulsory funded pension scheme (deined contribution scheme), and a voluntary funded pension scheme (deined contribution scheme).
The state pension insurance provides protection against the risks of old age, disability and losing a parent or a spouse and counts two separate tiers: employment-based old-age, work incapacity and survivors' pensions, and lat-rate residence-based national pensions.
The purpose of the national pension is to guarantee a minimum income for those who are not entitled to the employment-based pension, i.e. have less than 15 years of employment, or whose work incapacity pensions or survivor's pensions end up below the national pension. In addition to common old-age pensions, there are rules for special pensions and pensions under favorable conditions (e.g. pensions for the police, military, judges, artists, miners etc.), which allow retirement under special conditions.
The Estonian irst pillar
Coverage of the state pension insurance system (I pillar) is practically universal. Old-age pensions are comprised of three components: the lat rate base amount and the pensionable length of service component covering periods up to 1998, and the insurance component that is based on individual social tax payments to the state pension scheme covering periods from 1999 onwards. Each year, individual social tax payments are converted into points using a comparison with the average payment of the pension insurance part of the social tax 
Second pillar
The PAYG state pension insurance scheme is supplemented by a compulsory funded deined-contribution (DC) scheme (II pillar) that was introduced in 2002 by diverting a portion of contributions from the statutory PAYG scheme into private funds and introducing additional contributions by employees. The contribution rate is 6% of gross wages: the employee pays 2% from the gross wage and the employer another 4% (as part of the total 20% pension insurance contribution). The amount of pension beneits depends on total contributions over the working career and pension fund yields. The scheme covers the risk of old age, but not invalidity.
where I it -individual I pillar pension coeficient Wage it -individual earnings taxable with social tax STRII it -transfer rate to the II pillar from the social tax rate (either 0 or 0.04; temporarily values 0.02 and 0.06 were possible) AWage t -average earnings taxable with social tax.
Participation in the scheme is mandatory for cohorts born in 1983 or later, whereas cohorts born in 1942-1982 had the option to join the scheme voluntarily. By the end of 2012, the scheme was covering about 75% of the population aged 18 to 63 and 60% of the participants contributed. The funded scheme is run by private fund managers. By the end of 2012 the total value of assets in the compulsory funded scheme amounted to only EUR 1.47 billion (about 8.4% of GDP).
When people reach pension age they can withdraw their accumulated assets. Currently, the accumulated assets are rather small as the scheme has not matured yet. At the end of 2012, about 18,000 people had the right to collect beneits from the funded pension scheme.
About one third had postponed the withdrawal of their pensions. By the end of 2012, 51% of withdrawals had periodic payments from the pension fund without entering into an insurance contract. 39% of people had withdrawn their pensions in a lump sum. Finally, only 10% had insurance contracts. Whether these generate periodic payments depends on the size of accumulated assets. If they are larger than a certain amount, the person must take annuities.
The remaining wealth if one passes away is inherited.
At the end of 2012, the average gross old-age pension comprised about 34% of the average gross wage of a full-time worker in January 2013. The average net replacement rate is about 38-43%, depending on whether a pensioner is working or not at the same time.
Third pillar
The voluntary funded pension scheme (the third pillar) has played a minor role in Estonia so far. The voluntary funded pension contracts can be made by acquiring pension fund units from fund managers or with life insurers as pension insurance. There are two types of pension insurance contracts: pension insurance with guaranteed interest and pension insurance with investment risk. The scheme had about 50,000 participants (6% of people aged with assets of about EUR 85 million (about 0.6% of GDP) at the end of 2012. There were additionally about 68,000 contracts in the form of life insurance at the end of 2012.
How working longer affects pensions in Estonia
Working longer directly inluences old-age pensions in Estonia. In the state pension scheme (I pillar) each additional contribution adds to the sum of a person's insurance coeficients. Working longer has a non-linear effect around the pension age. In 2013, the statutory retirement age was 63 years for men and 62 years for women. It will be equalized at 63 by 2016, and as of 2017 it will gradually increase to 65 by 2026. In the irst pillar it is possible to retire up to 3 years earlier than the statutory pension age, but for each month, the pension is reduced by 0.4% 2 . Although the reduction is lower than the actuarially fair rate, people are punished by not being allowed to receive simultaneously labor earnings until they have reached the statutory pension age. It is also possible to defer retirement and for each month the pension is then increased by 0.9%, which is a higher rate than is actuarially fair. The quantitative effects are shown in Figure 3 . The results are gross (before income tax). The main assumption here is a working career of 40 years with average wage pension parameters.
Despite a high bonus for delaying retirement, it is rarely used. In 2012, only 2.0% of pensioners who entered into the old-age pension scheme had used the option to delay retirement.
The share was also low in previous years, but one can see a slightly increasing trend:
0.95% in 2009, 1.0% in 2010, 1.4% in 2011, 2.0% in 2012 3 . There have been no studies on the reasons why the use of this option has been so low, and how this could inluence labor market participation.
The use of the early retirement pension, on the other hand, is quite common; 19% of all people who entered the old-age pension scheme used early retirement in 2011 and 2012 4 . As the duration of unemployment beneits is short in Estonia and work-incapacity pensions are low (about 60% of old-age pensions), people choose early the retirement scheme as the only available way to leave the labor force. The entry rate was higher during the recent crisis when unemployment increased: 25% in 2009, 24% in 2010. Leetmaa et al. (2004) 5 show that the majority of people who enter the early retirement scheme come from unemployment or inactivity; about 80% of those did not have income from employment before entering the early retirement scheme.
In addition to state pensions, working longer directly impacts pensions from the funded pension schemes. There is no minimum guarantee neither on the return on investment nor on the minimum level of inal pensions in the funded pension schemes.
How increased life expectancy affects pensions in Estonia
Increased life expectancy directly inluences pensions to be converted to annuities from the funded schemes as the annuity rate is determined by expected remaining lifetime.
For funded pensions that are already converted to annuities, there is no impact on income level. This risk is with the annuity provider. Changes in life expectancy do not directly inluence pensions from the irst pillar, because neither the individual pension level nor the statutory pension age currently depend directly on life expectancy. However, increasing life expectancy will deinitely put pressure on public inances which may result in ad hoc increases of the pension age or changes in the other parameters of the pension system.
In Table 2 we illustrate the impact of increased life expectancy and working longer on total pension from the state pension scheme and the compulsory funded pension scheme using numerical calculations of typical workers using four scenarios and four different levels of earnings
The base scenario assumes 40 years of working (at age 25-64), retirement at a normal age (65) and a remaining life expectancy of 20 years. (In 2012 the average life expectancy at 65 was 17.3 years). We use the gross relative pension level (GRPL), which compares the gross old-age pension with the gross national average wage, to measure the level of pensions.
4
Estonian National Social Insurance Board, annual reports "Pensioners", own calculations. We use the person born in 1983 (obliged to join the compulsory funded pension scheme), with no children, who in 2009 did not continue paying down payments to the second pillar and also did not increase the payments to the second pillar 2014-2017 (as median Estonian).
A person with an average wage receives 39.1% of his pension from retirement time average wage. When life expectancy increases by one year, which leads to a lower pension from the funded pension scheme, the GRPL decreases by 0.55 percentage points (to 38.6%).
On the other hand, if employment duration increases by one year (meaning that the person must enter the labor market earlier), the GRPL increases 0.61 percentage points. When both life expectancy and employment duration increase by one year, then the total pension remains practically the same. The higher the labor earnings, the more sensitive are pensions to changes in employment duration and life expectancy 8 . A person with two-times average earnings loses or gains more than 1 percentage point of the replacement rate compared to the average wage. Persons with 2/3 of the average wage will be affected by less than half of a percentage point.
If the person postpones retirement after the normal retirement age then he receives a higher pension due to the extra bonus for pension deferment, as discussed earlier.
For Estonia there are no proper microsimulation models to analyze the future distribution of the pensions. Jõgi (2013) 9 uses a cohort microsimulation approach and shows with her 7
Makromajanduse näitajad 2000-2060 (01.10.2012) .xlsx http://www.struktuurifondid.ee/ile.php?10146460.
8 High income earners are more sensitive to the length of working career and life expectancy because pensions include the base component (about 1/3 of average pensions), which is not affected by earnings and which is more important for low income workers. As both the level of earnings and the years of employment have a direct effect on future pensions in Estonia, the most vulnerable groups are low wage earners, parents with young children and people with long and multiple unemployment spells. To reduce the impact of wages on future pensions, the lat rate part of the state pension is increasing slightly faster than the earnings related component. Unemployed people, either involved in passive or active unemployment policy measures, do not receive any pension credits and are therefore at the greatest risk.
To reduce the impact of parenthood on pensions, a set of policy measures (referred to as parental pension -vanemapension) to increase the old-age pension of those who have raised children was modiied recently 10 .
The impact of living and working longer on pension incomes in Hungary
The Hungarian pension system
The institutional structure of the Hungarian pension system is simple in international comparison. It is practically a single-pillar, universal PAYG scheme at a high degree of maturity offering near-full coverage to people both below and above the retirement age. The scheme has no inancial reserves whatsoever. The experiment with building up a second, pre-funded pillar ended in a near-complete U-turn and led to an almost complete defunding (Simonovits 2011) .
Occupational pensions are non-existent and the supplementary voluntary funded scheme is marginal.
The retirement age is 62 for both genders but various routes of early exit from the labor market result in lower effective retirement ages. In 2011, nearly 30% of beneiciaries who were younger than the oficial retirement age took up 25% of the beneits. The reasons for leaving the labor
10
Since 1 January 2013, for one parent of children born after 1 January 2013, the state transfers 4% of the average taxable income to the compulsory funded pension scheme until the child reaches 3 years. For children born before 1 January 2013, one of the parents of children who were born between 31 December 1980 and 31 December 2012 receive a pension supplement equal to the value of two annual coeficients when retiring. As of 1 January 2015, one of the parents of all children who were born before 1 January 2013 will receive an additional pension supplement at the value of one annual coeficient. market were various. New regulations that came into effect on January 1, 2012 locked many of these ways and narrowed those that remained open, making retirement below the standard retirement age more dificult. Since most recipients whose beneits have been in payment kept their eligibility, the effects will be felt gradually. The oficial retirement age will grow to 65
as the age limit is increased by half a year for each consecutive cohort until 2022. Since 2011, pensions in payment have been indexed by consumer prices. This ended a two-decade long struggle of consecutive governments to reduce the full wage-indexation to a price-indexation.
These three recent changes (fewer options for early labor market exit, the increase in oficial retirement age and indexation to prices rather than wages) affect the length of the contributory and the retired career as well as the age-proile of beneits. The combined effect is a likely increase in entry pensions due to longer contributory periods and a detachment of pensions and wages, in particular in long pensioner careers. The population particularly at risk in this respect are older women living alone. Compared to other European countries, Hungarian mortality statistics are poor but improving. The working assumption among demographers is that the same way as East-German mortality caught up to the West's over the course of two decades, East-European mortalities, including
The impact of living longer on pensions in Hungary
Hungary's, will catch up to the European average in the next decades. Life expectancy (LEXP) at birth in 2011 was 71 years for men and 78 years for women (see Table 3A ), about 5 years lower than the EU average (see also Due to methodological differences in estimating life expectancies in higher ages, the Hungarian Statistical Ofice regularly releases lower life expectancy igures than the Eurostat.
In only ive years, between 2006 and 2011, it improved nearly a full year for women and almost two full years for men. This also reveals a diminishing gender gap, which is also relatively large compared to Europe. Although much of the improvement occurred in the active or newly retired cohorts, life expectancy at the age of 65 also increased by half a year over the same period. Tendencies are similar, though less clear, in the case of healthy life expectancies with the important difference that the gender gap is smaller. This predicts longer periods of morbidity and disability for women.
Working longer
By defunding the pre-funded pillar in 2011-2012, the opportunity to accumulate net wealth and reap the second demographic dividend 12 was missed. Instead, Hungary turned to the remedy of longer working lives as an alternative means for regaining long-term iscal balance. Forceful measures were taken in order to raise the effective retirement age. In 2011, nearly 30 percent of beneiciaries who were younger than the oficial retirement age received 25 percent of beneits. The routes to leave the labor market were various. New regulations that came into effect on January 1, 2012 locked many of these ways and narrowed those that remained open, making retirement below the standard retirement age more dificult.
In 2012, recipients of disability pension had to go through a complex revision of health conditions unless their working ability was 100 percent lost or they were close enough to the standard retirement age. In effect, this procedure led to only a limited number of beneit annulations but it effectively decreased the number of new entries. The other large group of early retirees were beneiciaries of a service-length-based early retirement, which offered beneits with no or only minor reductions. This route of early exit was closed down altogether as of January 1, 2012. Yet another subgroup of old-age pensioners below retirement age worked as members of the armed forces or had dangerous and hazardous jobs. This exit route will also be phased out or limited.
Due to the phasing out periods, most recipients whose beneits have been in payment kept their eligibility and the effects will be felt gradually. However, this process started earlier. Figure   4 presents the time series of the effective retirement age by gender estimated as a weighted average age of leaving the labor force. It is still rather low compared to the rest of Europe
12
The irst demographic dividend is created, in the form of additional economic growth, by a relatively large generation going through the active section of their lifecycle. The same effect, however, hampers growth when the generation in question retires. If the ageing process of this generation is combined with increasing life expectancies and decreasing fertility, the demand for wealth increases. If this demand is realized in the form of additional savings, the resulting capital deepening also adds to growth. This is called the second demographic dividend (Bloom et al. 2002; Lee et al. 2003) . The demographic window of opportunity between the mid-1990s and the mid-2010s in Hungary offered a chance of building up net savings and reaping the second demographic dividend later but the country missed this opportunity.
but it has been increasing, especially in recent years. Over the course of the ive years between 2008 and 2013, the average exit age increased by 1.5 years for men and 1.7 years for women. Due to the phasing out of most early retirement options, this igure is expected to grow even further although another new rule will likely limit this effect. In October 2010, the government opened up a new retirement channel for women independent of age based exclusively on working years. Since then, women have been allowed to retire after 40 contributory years (including periods on maternal leave). 
Beneit levels
The minimal service period for a full old-age pension is 20 years. The beneit formula is based on length of service and a proxy of contributions. Since the pension insurance administration
does not yet have an electronic register on contributions paid by or on behalf of the insured, a proxy is created from wages in and after 1988. Pensions are tax exempt because they are calculated from net wages (although what constitutes a net wage was redeined in 2008). Pensions in payment are indexed by prices. Neither the beneit formula nor any other components of beneit rules relect changing life expectancies, making the system vulnerable to the demographic transition. The relative income position of the Hungarian elderly is the most favorable in the European Union. The at-risk-of-poverty measure (AROP in the table) is the lowest both in the 65+
and the 75+ female populations and the 3rd and 2nd lowest, respectively in these two age categories among men (see Table 3B ). The relative median income ratio (RMIR in the table,
persons aged 65 years and older compared to persons aged less than 65 years) is the 3rd highest among the member states for both genders (in the case of men in a draw with France).
Its value is above one for men, meaning that the elderly in fact have a higher median income than those younger than 65 years.
Existing research
The simple question of how pensions will be affected if the working career is extended by a year, if life expectancy at the retirement age increases by a year or if both happen simultaneously has not been addressed for Hungary so far.
The effect of the pension system on the labor supply of older workers has been analyzed by Cseres-Gergely (2008) The pension administration is currently working on a new dynamic microsimulation model, MIDAS_HU. The model will have a demographic module combined with a marriage market (modeling processes of birth, household formation, marriage/cohabitation, divorce/split and death), a labor market module (modeling employment and wages) and a pension system module (modeling the accumulation of eligibilities, retirement and a pensioner career). It will be based on administrative data.
The impact of living and working longer on pension incomes in Poland
The Polish pension system
After the 1999 reform, the Polish pension system for employees and the self-employed consists of three pillars. The irst pillar is a mandatory notional-accounts deined contribution (NDC) scheme. The notional interest rate is deined as 100 percent of the growth of the real covered wage bill, and no less than price inlation. The second pillar is a voluntary funded Two recent reforms will have a further impact on pension income in Poland. The irst reform has shifted a part of the contributions from the mandatory FDC to the NDC system since 2011, but assumes that the beneit formula will be very similar. If the rates of return in the FDC and NDC systems during the accumulation phase differ, this may inluence future pension incomes. The second reform will have a more important impact: the retirement age has been raised gradually to 67 for both men and women as of 2013. Men will reach the new retirement age by 2020, and women by 2040.
First, we briely indicate the impact of reforms on retirement incomes in Poland. Second, 13 The new legislation that came into force in February 2014 made the second pillar voluntary, i.e. an insured person can pay the entire old-age pension contribution (19.2 %) to the irst pillar only. The decision can be reversed every two years. 14 This is actuarially fair if one assumes that the real interest rate is negligible.
we present simple estimates of the impact of working and living longer on future pensions in the Polish system.
The impact of reforms on pension incomes
Current pensioners are relatively well off when compared to average incomes in the country. In 2011 the replacement rate i.e. pension income relative to the average wage level was 60 percent (ZUS, 2012) . The risk of poverty of people 65+ is lower in Poland than in EU-27 countries. The percentage of the population aged 65+ with incomes below the at-risk-of-poverty threshold was 14.2 percent in Poland and 15.9 percent in the EU-27 (EC, 2012) . Note that the risk-of-poverty-rate in Poland is substantially higher for women (16.8 percent) than for men (9.9 percent) due to the shorter work careers, lower wages and longer life expectancy of women in Poland.
Older people, for whom a beneit from the irst and second old-age pillars would be lower than the minimum pension, are entitled to the minimum pension. Eligibility criteria for the minimum pension include a minimum of 25 years of work experience for men and 20 years for women (this requirement for women will increase with an increase in the retirement age). Currently the minimum pension is equal to about 24 percent of the average wage. Under current rules of indexation the ratio of the minimum pension to the average wage is expected to decrease in the future. According to Chlon-Domińczak and Strzelecki (2013) , the lack of changes in the current indexation method will result in the minimum pension falling below the International Labor Organization (ILO) standard of poverty protection of the elderly by the mid-2020s.
Additionally, many people at retirement age might not meet the eligibility criteria, as around 30 percent of persons at retirement age 15 can have total work experience below the required level (Chlon-Domińczak and Strzelecki, 2013). As a result, the risk of poverty among people at retirement age who are not eligible for the minimum pension is increasing.
The replacement rates (RR) are expected to substantially decrease in the future as a result of the 1999 pension reform and the transition from the more generous and redistributive DB formula to the DC formula. Poland exhibits one of the largest drops in replacement rates among the EU-27 in the years 2010-2050 at 34.6 percent for an average income earner with a 40 year career (EC, 2012). Jablonowski and Muller (2013) project an even larger drop in that replacement rate for median contributors, up to 15-18 percent in the period from 2015 to 2060 16 . Twenty percent of the above reduction in RR is due to the increase in life expectancy (Jablonowski and Muller, 2013) .
15
The authors assume pre-reform retirement age, i.e. 60 for females and 65 for males. The main factors that explain the expected decrease in replacement rates in Poland include: minimum pension guarantee subject to strict eligibility criteria, pension beneits adjusted to life expectancy, and pension beneits based on life-time earnings (while in the old system they were based on the highest earnings from 10 consecutive years). People with career breaks and short careers as well as low earners will receive lower beneits than they would have received in the old system because of a stronger link between contributions and beneits.
Pension beneits will vary across cohorts and gender. The cohorts born between 1965 and 1985 will have lower pension beneits than the cohorts born before 1965 (Jablonowski and Muller, 2013) . The differences in pension beneits can be explained by the following factors:
relatively generous estimation of initial capital of older cohorts, decreasing real wage growth and higher life expectancy. According to Leifels et al. (2010) , an average female born in 1955 will be able to maintain 50 percent of her pre-retirement consumption, while a representative female born in 1976 will be able to maintain only 35 percent.
Simple estimation of the impact on living and working longer on future pensions
Below we present the results of simple estimates of the hypothetical impact of working and living longer on future pensions in the Polish system. We analyze a hypothetical individual who retires in 2013 and retires at age 60, 65 or 67. We consider two cases: short and long professional careers. We deine a short career as 25 years of work and a long career as 45 years of work. For simpliication, we assume no inactivity periods or unemployment spells in the careers. The pension contribution rate equals to 19.52 percent. We also assume that annuities calculated from the capital accumulated both in the irst and the second pillars are calculated in the same way using period life tables. In the Polish case being a man or a woman is not relevant in the pension formula as unisex life tables are used in the calculation of the pension beneit.
Other assumptions are:
1. Changes in life expectancy. In the base scenario we use the 2013 life tables for Poland and assume that LE increases by one year respectively at each potential retirement age. 2. Wages. Age wage proiles are increasing, real individual wage rises 2% every year.
3. Indexation of the pension capital. In the long run we assume the same indexation or rate of return on contributions paid into both pillars based on the real growth of the contribution base, equal to 2 per cent.
The results for a hypothetical change in beneits and replacement rates are summarized in the tables below. Under our assumptions, an additional year of full-time work adds between 9.9 and 10.7
percent to the level of pensions for people with short careers and between 8.0 and 8.8 percent for people with long careers (see Table 4a ). This is due to the longer indexation of the pension capital, additional contributions paid into the individual pension accounts and lower remaining life expectancy at (respectively) 61, 66 or 68 years. An additional year of work results only in small gains in replacement rates because it has two opposite effects: on the one hand an additional year of work increases the monthly pension beneit, on the other hand the denominator of the replacement rate increases as well because of the assumed increase in average wages (see Table 4b ). The gain from working one year longer is much higher than the possible loss due to a one year increase in life expectancy. Therefore, working longer and living longer has a positive impact on the accrual rate.
The impact of living and working longer on pension incomes in the Netherlands
The Dutch pension system
The Dutch pension system consists of three pillars. A lat base pension income (AOW) that roughly provides the minimum wage offers insurance against poverty. Employees accrue a funded pension income linked to their average wage. Finally the voluntary third pillar is important primarily for non-employees such as the self-employed and for employees who did not work full time for many years and therefore accrued less beneits in the second pillar.
The irst and second pillar of the Dutch pension system have recently been adjusted to accommodate changes in life expectancy and to encourage people to work longer. The third pillar is likely to be adjusted soon. We briely analyze these reforms and indicate their impact on retirement incomes in the Netherlands.
Note that the older population is currently rather well off in the Netherlands. Knoef et al. (2013) computed that only a small percentage of the older population has an income below the minimum income level. These must be inhabitants who do not qualify for full AOW beneits.
The main criterion to apply for full beneits is to have lived in the Netherlands as of the age of 15 until the age of 65. Immigrants, often from countries like Morocco and Turkey, are the main group that does not meet this criterion. If they lived in the Netherlands e.g. for 30 years before retirement, they are eligible for 30/50 = 60% of the regular beneits.
Not only absolute retirement income is important though. In the Netherlands the social norms are based on the replacement ratio, i.e. on pension income relative to the average wage level over the years. Knoef et al. (2013) report that approximately 50% of the Dutch population receives pension income of more than 2/3 of their inal income. Here the self-employed are the main group at risk, as they often have not contributed voluntarily to the third pillar pension products that are offered by insurers. The probability of reaching this replacement ratio is higher for low income workers, who rely primarily on AOW income.
First pillar adjustment to increases in life expectancy
In 2012 the Dutch government decided to relate the eligibility age for the irst pillar pension to observed life expectancy. The eligibility age for this pension beneit has been at the age of 65 ever since its introduction in the 1950s. A gradual increase in the eligibility age was implemented so that it will reach the age of 67 in 2024. As of 2024, the eligibility age will be linked to the observed life expectancy, implying that it is quite likely to increase even further.
The automatic link that is established aims to add to the sustainability of the government budget while reducing future political controversies, as increases in the retirement age are likely to remain unpopular with the electorate. Note though, while in 2010 few people supported the increases in the retirement age, this reform is now widely accepted.
A relevant point to note is that the government decided to link the retirement age to observed life expectancy rather than to projected life expectancy, i.e. to use period rather than cohort tables. The difference between the two can be substantial. Projected life expectancy is arguably the more fair measure, but requires consensus among actuaries on the adequate projection.
Observed life expectancy is computed from observed current survival rates per cohort, ignoring their likely future improvements.
The group that will be most affected by the current adjustment in the irst pillar retirement age is the group of workers that retired early in the early-retirement schemes that were inancially very attractive and widely used until recently. These workers will not have predicted the change in policy and can be left without an income for several months as the early retirement schemes stop paying at the age of 65. Once the measure has been fully implemented, the increased eligibility age for AOW pension of course implicitly assumes that people will work longer and that the actual retirement age will increase.
A relevant question is also whether beneiciaries can claim AOW pensions before the statutory age (of 67 or more as of 2024). Such adjustments can in theory be implemented in an actuarially fair way although actual implementations can imply non-trivial value distributions (see Sanders, de Waegenaere and Nijman 2013) . The option to claim AOW early would be attractive for workers in physically demanding jobs or with otherwise reduced human capital. After several changes in the proposed law, the inal outcome is (for now) that such options are not offered, enhancing the income risks of vulnerable older workers with often reduced life expectancies.
Second pillar adjustments and their impact
For new accruals, the formal eligibility age for the supplementary work-related second pillar pensions has been adjusted in line with the AOW adjustments. Note that there is a marked difference in the impact of increased life expectancy in the funded second pillar versus the PAYG irst pillar. In the irst pillar, pension income is affected directly because participants simply receive their beneits at least two years later (as of 2024). In the second pillar new accruals are based on the new eligibility age but existing beneits as of retirement age 65
are actuarially fairly converted to the new eligibility age. As current older workers will already have accrued almost all beneits, their second pillar pension income is hardly affected by the adjustments.
Second pillar pension beneits are accrued on the net income after adjusting for the level of AOW. Low income workers will therefore receive only a small portion of their total income as second pillar pension. They rely primarily on the irst pillar and are therefore more signiicantly affected by the adjustments in the eligibility ages.
On top of the changes in the eligibility ages, the level of second pillar pension incomes will also be affected by changes in (projected) life expectancies. The labor unions and employer organizations that are responsible for second pillar pensions have agreed that increases in the present value of the liabilities due to changes in survival rates will lead to income cuts in real terms (usually implying less compensation for inlation), where shocks are smoothed out over a ten year horizon. Note that projected life expectancies rather than observed life expectancies are important here.
Changes in life expectancies can thus affect the purchasing power of the second pillar income, even that of very old people. The annual adjustments in the actuarial value of liabilities of pension funds are usually not too sizable (say less than 2%) and will be smoothed out over a ten year period.
Third pillar adjustments and their impact
The pay-out phase of third pillar products is to take the form of annuities 17 that is of lifelong income streams, like in the irst and second pillar. In the third pillar these annuities have to be nominally guaranteed euro amounts, i.e. the income streams and date as of which they are received do not depend on investment returns during the decumulation phase nor on changes in life expectancy or survival probabilities. The risk of changes in life expectancy is therefore fully on the insurers. This makes these products costly for the individual. Currently there is a policy discussion going on in the Netherlands about whether or not to allow variable annuities in the third pillar, where the periodic income would depend on investment returns and changes in some objective index of life expectancy, e.g. the one published by Statistics Netherlands.
17
Recently one exception was introduced, the so called "bank saving products" which require an income stream of at least 20 years.
The impact on pension income of delayed beneit claiming and/or working longer
As discussed before, irst pillar beneits cannot be claimed earlier or later than the date as of which one is entitled to receive them. Second pillar pension wealth can be used though to generate a lat income proile as of a certain date before the date as of which one is eligible for irst pillar beneits. The level of second pillar income in future years will then be adjusted in an actuarially fair way. For the average worker, irst pillar and second pillar income roughly contribute evenly to retirement income and one can easily claim beneits before the AOW eligibility age. However, low income workers could have insuficient second pillar wealth to do so. A worker who initially planned to retire at the age of 63 but decides to retire one year later will have to take less actuarially equivalent wealth out of the second pillar. Claiming one year later therefore increases pension income in retirement by some 8%.
Working longer does not generate additional irst pillar pension beneits, as this pillar is purely based on residence. In the second pillar, one typically accrues 2% of income for every working year, so the total effect of working longer on pension income is 1% for those for whom both sources of pension income are equally important. Accruals in later years (just before retirement) are subsidized using the so-called uniform accrual and contribution mechanism ("doorsnee systematiek"). Young and old workers pay the same contribution for the same accrued pension income as of retirement, which ignores the impact of discounting on the value of the accrual. This affects pension contributions, but not pension income after retirement.
The impact on pension income of a one year increase in life expectancy
The eligibility age for irst pillar income is linked to life expectancy in the Netherlands, as discussed before, but the level of the irst pillar income is not. In the second pillar, an increase in life expectancy affects the estimated value of the liabilities of the pension fund, reduces the so-called funding ratio (value of asset over liabilities) and subsequently implies that pension beneits will de facto be cut by approximately the same percentage as the increase in liabilities.
This can be because of less compensation for inlation or even because nominal beneits have been cut
18 . An increase in life expectancy of one year increases the value of the liabilities of a typical pension fund by around 5%. If we assume that individuals compensate the later eligibility for irst pillar entitlement by using second pillar pension wealth (see before), the total impact on pension income will be 0.5*(5% + 8%) = 6.5%.
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The cuts in nominal beneits that had to be implemented by many Dutch pension funds in 2013 were substantially affected by the adjusted predictions of the future survival probabilities of the Dutch Actuarial Soency in 2010 which increased the value of the liabilities for the average pension fund by some 7%. Table 6 summarizes the evidence in the previous sections on the impact of living and working longer on pension incomes in the ive countries. All ive countries have taken policy measures to adjust the statutory retirement age to keep the pension system sustainable, given the clear and universal increase in life expectancy. As a consequence of this and of policy measures that make early retirement inancially less attractive, the actual average retirement ages have already increased sharply in most countries.
A comparison of the impact of living and working longer on pension incomes in the ive countries
The countries differ in the way the inherent uncertainty about future life expectancy is handled.
In some countries future adjustments in the retirement age are simply left to future political decision making. Other countries (such as the Netherlands and the Scandinavian countries, including Finland) have taken one step further and have already announced how deviations in future projected or observed life expectancies from current estimates will affect the eligibility age for pension income or its level. Although future political decision-making can of course adjust the currently announced rules, the advantage of such a mechanism is that new (unpopular) political decisions are not required if life expectancies increase further, which supports the sustainability of the system. In Estonia, while the level of pension income is linked to the (also uncertain) levels of price and wage inlation, there is now link with estimated life expectancy in the pay-as-you-go pillar. Note also that whenever eligibility ages or level of pension incomes are linked to estimates of life expectancy, one has to make the important decision of whether or not to use period life tables which are based on currently observed death rates or projections of future death rates. The former has the advantage of being objective while the latter requires subjective modeling by actuaries. But the former is implicitly based on the unrealistic assumption that e.g. the death rates for the current 70 year olds will still be the same when the current 20 year olds reach that age. Different countries have chosen different mechanisms here. Table 7 compares and summarizes estimates of the impact of working or living longer on pension income in four of the ive countries (these numbers are unfortunately not available for Hungary). The numbers that are reported are rough estimates for average workers, and the precise impact will typically depend on all kinds of characteristics of the individual which are not accounted for in this table. The comparison suggests that the impact of an increase in life expectancy on pension income is strikingly different in the ive countries, while the inancial incentives to claim beneits later or to work longer are roughly similar.
To start with the irst issue, the costs of an increase in life expectancy are primarily borne by the next generation in Estonia as under the current rules, the income level of retirees is hardly affected (-0.5%) by such an increase. In Finland, Poland and the Netherlands the incomes of retirees who do not adjust their labor supply (work longer) or claim beneits later is much more substantially affected by an increase in life expectancy, with estimated impacts of -3.5% to -6.5% for the 'average' person. The pension systems in these countries are more sustainable, because a substantial part of the costs of increases in life expectancy is not shifted to future generations but is imposed on retiree income.
The impact of working longer on pension income depends on two components: additional pension income because pension beneits are claimed later and additional accrual of pension rights because of an additional year of work. Starting with the irst component, the second row in Table 7 shows that in all four countries the annual income during retirement increases substantially if one starts claiming beneits later. The increase for the average worker is approximately actuarially fair because, depending on exact assumptions on interest rates and survival probabilities, the annuity factor for a lat annuity income after retirement is somewhat above 10.
As for the second component, in Finland, older workers accrue 4.5% additional pension income if they have longer working lives. Such mechanisms are absent in the other three countries
19
. Nevertheless, the inancial incentives to work longer and claim beneits later are sizable nowadays in all four countries, as relected in the third row of Table 7 . 19 In the Netherlands pension accrual is more generous in later than in earlier years because of the so called uniform contribution and accrual mechanism (see section 6). This affects the contributions to be paid rather than the accrual and therefore does not affect the numbers in the table.
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With regard to Hungary, the answer No in the last question applies only to the very small fraction that still has a funded pension. Relative impact on retirement income at the age 70 if the life expectancy in the population increases by one year and beneits are still claimed at the age of 63 and one leaves the labor force at the age of 63 -3.5% -0.4% -5% -6.5%
Relative impact on retirement income at the age 70 if a worker decides not to claim beneits at the age of 63 but at the age of 64 (and does not adjust his/her labor supply)
9%
10% 7% 8%
Relative impact on retirement income at the age 70 if a worker claims beneits at the age of 64 rather than 63 and also quits the labor force one year later, at the age of 64 rather than at the age of 63 9% 12% 9% 9%
Source: Own calculations.
Concluding remarks
In this paper we analyzed the impact of working and living longer on pension incomes in ive European countries. The paper shows the diversity of the policy measures taken in the various countries. All countries stimulate people to leave the labor force and claim beneits at an older age. In some countries the inancial costs of living longer are primarily imposed on the retirees themselves, while in other countries, based on the current rules of the retirement system, future generations will have to bear the burden. The inancial incentives to work longer and postpone claiming pension beneits in the four countries for which we could quantify them are roughly similar.
